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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IPRISONMENT FOR DEBT--'WORTHLESS CHECK"
AcTs.n a recent case the defendant was indicted for making and deliver-
ing a "cold check" under a statute punishing the making or delivering of a
check, draft, or order for payment of money without sufficient funds, re-
gardless of fraudulent intent or knowledge. Held, that the statute, since it
did not make fraud an element of the crime, violated the provision in the
state constitution forbidding imprisonment for debt, and was therefore
void. Burnham v. Commonwealth (1929), 228 Ky. 410, 155 S. W. (2d) 256.
The constitutions of many of the states contain provisions prohibiting
arrest and imprisonment for debt. Cases of fraud are usually excepted
from this provision either expressly or by judicial interpretation.
5 C. J. 438. Statutes making it a criminal offense to issue a check with-
out funds to meet it, the so-called "worthless check" acts, have been held
generally not to violate constitutional provisions against imprisonment for
debt. But in all these cases, with one exception, the statutes involved re-
quire the element of fraud in the transaction. Both knowledge on the
part of the maker of the check or lack of funds and an intent to defraud
are essential. State v. Pilling (1909), 53 Wash. 464, 102 Pac. 230; State
v. Meeks (Ariz. 1926), 247 Pac. 1099. Or they require merely a knowledge
of the insufficiency or lack of funds. Hollis v. State (1921), 152 Ga. 182,
108 S. E. 783; State v. Avery (1922), 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838; State v.
Yarboro (1927), 194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216. In the single exception noted,
the case of Neidlinger v. State (1916), 17 Ga. App. 811, 88 S. E. 687, where
the statute required neither intent to defraud nor knowledge of insufficiency
or lack of funds, the court read into the statute a requirement of fraudulent
intent, holding that unless the statute did require such intent it would be
invalid, since it would violate the constitutional provision against imprison-
ment for debt. Although this is the only case which contains an express
statement to this effect, the inference may be clearly drawn from the
other cases that it is the requirement of fraudulent intent which relieves
the statutes of constitutional objection.
The principal case, although it is the first case to hold a "worthless
check" act unconstitutional, is in accord with the spirit of previous de-
cisions upholding such acts where proof of fraudulent intent is made es-
sential. And it is certainly consistent with the humane policy which has
resulted in the near-extinction of the control of the creditor over the person
of his debtor. P. S. A., '31.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIARY-
PowER OvER BAR ADmISsIONS.-Petitioner, having previously been disbar-
red by the Court of Appeals, applied to it for readmission to the practice
of law. A statute provided that the Supreme Court should have the power
of admission and disbarment, but that all applications for admission and
readmission should be made to a board of governors of the state bar asso-
ciation. Held, that the statute is invalid as an encroachment on the power
of the courts. Nevertheless, since the court believed that the procedure
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
described was beneficial, the petitioner was obliged to follow it. In re Gate
(Cal. App. 1929), 270 Pac. 968. The bar association, considering the
main ruling unfavorable to it, obtained two rehearings, the second of which
is valuable because of its ably-written opinions. In re Gate (Cal. App.
(1928), 273 Pac. 617.
The gist of the decision is that the power to admit to the bar is exclusively
judicial and that therefore the legislature may not prescribe rules and
regulations affecting this power. The basis of this reasoning is that since
attorneys are officers of the court they are properly a part Of the judicial
department, and therefore neither the legislative nor the executive de-
partment can participate in their appointment or removal. Courts uni-
formly approve of this doctrine, but many have gone farther to say-
believing that their statements are in no way inconsistent-that notwith-
standing the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject the legislature may
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for admission to the bar which
will be followed by the courts. Ex parte Garland (1866), 4 Wall. 333;
In re Applicants for License to Practice Law (1906), 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E.
635; In re Bailey (1926), 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29; In re Taylor (1877),
48 Md. 28; Cohen v. Wright (1863), 22 Cal. 293; In re Mock (1905), 146
Cal. 378, 80 Pac. 64. With the exception of In re Applicants for License
to Practice Law, supra, this has always been construed as not restricting
the courts from imposing further requirements. In re Bailey, supra; In re
Day (1899), 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646 and cases cited therein.
Most courts which profess to permit legislative action in this matter
follow the logic of Ex parte Garland, supra, where the court said: "The
Legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office to which
he [the attorney] must conform, as it may, wherever it has exclusive juris-
diction, prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any ordinary avocation
in life. The question, in this case, is not as to the power of Congress to
prescribe qualifications . . ." It is significant that no authority was
cited for this view, and also that it was not the point at issue in the case.
In In re Day, supra, the court declared: "The fact that the Legislature may
prescribe qualifications of doctors, plumbers, horse-shoers, and persons
following other professions or callings not connected with the judicial sys-
tem, and may say what shall be evidence of such qualifications, can have
no influence on the question. A license to such persons confers no right to
put the judicial power in motion, or to participate in judicial proceedings."
In the principal case it was announced that "the idea that the courts may
frame rules governing admissions to the bar is utterly inconsistent with
the idea that the Legislature, under any circumstances, may do the same
thing."
It will be found that in most cases which support the power of the legis-
lative department to fix standards for bar admission such holdings are
merely dictum. Where the existence of this power has been the point at
issue, courts have generally evaded the issue, adopting the regulations as
their own but refusing to say whether they were valid without such adop-
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tion. In r'e Goodell (1875), 39 Wis. 232. Recent cases have been more
explicit. In In re Bruen (1918), 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152, it was
held that a statute giving the state board of law examiners power to hear
and determine disbarment proceedings was unconstitutional in so far as it
authorized the board to enter judgments of disbarment and valid only as
to the delegated administrative function of reporting its findings to the
court. And in Olmsted's Case (1928), 292 Pa. 96, 140 At. 634, the court
declared: "'The true rule is as follows: Statutes dealing with admissions
to the bar will be judicially recognized as valid, so far as, but no further
than, the legislation involved does not encroach on the right of the courts
to say who shall be admitted to that privilege." This is substantially in
accord with the principal case.
The trend of the later cases seems to be that although the legislatures
may require applicants to the bar to be good citizens, only the courts can
set up standards for attorneys in their professional capacity. This prin-
ciple is of immediate importance in view of the fact that requirements for
admission to the bar in many states are not what they should be. The
American Bar Association has drafted a model set of regulations, and has
spent a great deal of effort in trying to convince backward legislatures to
put them into the statute books. Under the ruling of the principal case,
the courts need have no hesitancy in adopting the standards proposed with-
out waiting for legislative enactment. J. A. G., '31.
CONTRACT TO MARRY-EFFECT UPON RIGHT OF CONVEYANCE.-TaulIor V.
Taylor (N. C. 1929). 148 S. E. 171, contrary to what might be supiosed, is
not exceptional in holding: "Where parties have bound themselves by a con-
tract to marry, neither can give away his or her property without the con-
sent of the other; and notice before marriage of such gift does not hinder
the party injured from insisting on its invalidity." The defendant married
the plaintiff after having seduced her through a promise of marriage. Two
days before the marriage, the defendant conveyed all of his property to his
father by deed purported to have been signed by the plaintiff as well as by
the defendant. The latter, after the marriage, induced the plaintiff to go to
California with him, but instead, they stopped at Reno, Nevada, where he
forced the plaintiff to sign a deed of separation prepared by a North Caro-
lina lawyer. The two continued to live together notwithstanding the deed
of separation until the plaintiff by reason of continual indignities sued for
alimony. The North Carolina Court granted the alimony, set aside the deed
of separation as inconsistent with public policy, and declared the deed to the
property fraudulent.
Wherever, in these cases, there is a voluntary antenuptial transfer of
property without the knowledge or consent of the intended spouse and
shortly before the contemplated marriage, the courts are quick to presume
fraud. This is true even where the gift is genuine and not merely color-
able as in the principal case. Wallace v. Wallace (1908), 137 Iowa 169,
114 N. W. 913. There is some authority to the effect that the courts would
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